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Abstract: The strong correlation between parents’ economic status and that of their children has 
been well-documented, but little is known about the extent to which this is a causal phenomenon.  
This paper attempts to improve our understanding of the causal processes that contribute to 
intergenerational immobility by exploiting historical changes in compulsory schooling laws that 
affected the educational attainment of parents without affecting their innate abilities or 
endowments.  We examine the influence of parental compulsory schooling on children’s grade-
for-age using the 1960, 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses. Our estimates indicate that a one-year 
increase in the education of either parent reduces the probability that a child repeats a grade by 
between two to four percentage points.  Among 15 to 16 year olds living at home, we also 
estimate that parental compulsory schooling significantly lowers the likelihood of dropping out.  
These findings suggest that education policies may be able to reduce part of the intergenerational 
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 I. Introduction 
 
A high degree of persistence in economic status exists across generations, but we know 
very little about the causal processes that drive this phenomenon.  For example, children who 
grow up in more highly educated families have better labor market outcomes as adults than 
children who grow up in less educated families, but we do not know whether this is because 
education changes something about childhood experiences or because genetic or environmental 
factors that contributed to the parents’ educational levels are shared by their children.  This paper 
attempts to improve our understanding of the causal processes that contribute to intergenerational 
immobility by exploiting historical changes in compulsory schooling laws that affected the 
educational attainment of parents without affecting their innate abilities.  Quantifying the extent 
to which children’s well-being can be improved by increasing their parents’ education also has 
important implications for public policy: most discussions about the government’s role in 
providing educational aid, for example, focus on the individual’s return to education and ignore 
the possibility of social benefits.  Knowing that there are intergenerational returns to increased 
schooling would provide a further rationale for such programs. 
Few studies have attempted to isolate the causal effect of education on the next 
generation’s well-being.
1  This is at least partly due to the fact that it is difficult to find plausible 
sources of identifying variation.  It is also hard to find large, nationally representative datasets 
that simultaneously provide information on parental characteristics and children’s outcomes.       
Our use of compulsory schooling laws applied to Census data allow us to overcome both of these 
                                                 
1 By “causal” we mean the effect of an exogenous increase in education itself, rather than the simple correlation 
between a child’s outcome and her parents’ education, which also reflects the effect of innate parental 
characteristics.  Changes in parental schooling levels may change many family background characteristics such as 
income, choice of marriage partner, and decisions about children’s education.  Our IV estimates will capture the 
effect of all family background characteristics that are affected by education but will not reflect the effect of innate 
parental characteristics such as intelligence.   2
problems.  Several studies have already demonstrated a strong relationship between these laws 
and individuals’ educational attainment,
2 and have used this relationship to identify the effects of 
education on earnings [Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000], criminal activity [Lochner and Moretti, 
2004], mortality [Lleras-Muney, 2005], and subjective measures of well-being [Oreopoulos, 
2003], but this is the first study to estimate the intergenerational effects of the U.S. laws.   
Our main analysis is based on a sample of children ages 7-15 taken from the 1960, 1970 
and 1980 individual U.S. Census files.  We examine the effects of parental education on 
children’s human capital accumulation, and find that it has substantial and significant positive 
effects. A one year increase in parents’ combined schooling reduces the probability that a child is 
at the normal grade given her age by two to four percentage points.  This effect is somewhat 
larger than OLS estimates would suggest. We also find evidence that among teenagers still living 
at home, parents’ educational attainment decreases children’s likelihood of dropping out of high 
school.   
 
II. Background Literature 
    A few previous studies have attempted to isolate the causal influence of parental 
education by using variation within sibling or twin pairs [Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002; 
Currie and Moretti, 2003; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994].  This enables them to control for 
mother fixed effects, but may exacerbate biases if within pair differences in characteristics affect 
outcomes independent of their effect on education.
3 Such estimates are also known to be more 
prone to measurement error problems (Griliches, 1979).  Currie and Moretti (2003) also isolate 
                                                 
2 See Angrist and Krueger (1991), Lleras-Muney (2005), and Goldin and Katz (2003).  Harmon and Walker (2000) 
and Oreopoulos (2003) find that a similar relationship exists in the United Kingdom and Canada.   
3  Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1994), for example, find birth weight differences between twins correlate 
significantly with schooling differences and subsequent earnings.  Recent work by Antonovics and Goldberger 
(2005) questions the robustness of the Behrman and Rosenzweig’s (2002) results.     3
the effect of mothers’ education on birth outcomes using county level date on college openings 
between 1940 and 1990 to capture differences in the availability of educational services among 
different cohorts of women. Sacerdote (2002, 2004) compares outcomes of adoptees who were 
randomly assigned to their adoptive parents.  This approach is appealing because it is impossible 
to ascribe the intergenerational link to a genetic inheritance, but an observed correlation could 
still be driven by parental characteristics that are not genetically transmitted to children but that 
nevertheless affect both individual and offspring’s human capital accumulation.  Across these 
studies, the magnitude and precision of the estimated effects of parental education varies, but 
most find that parental education has at least a small impact on children’s outcomes.
4   
Most existing studies have also relied on small, non-representative, datasets.  The 
Behrman and Rosenzweig study, for example, uses samples of 212 female twin pairs and 122 
male twin pairs who participated in the Minnesota Twin Registry.  Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1994) use a sample of unusually young mothers from the NLSY.  Likewise, Sacerdote’s 
analyses focus on fewer than 200 adoptees per sample who were born in Britain (the first 
sample) or adopted in Colorado (the second sample).  
  Recent papers by Chevalier (2003) and Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) also use 
changes in compulsory schooling laws to identify the effect of parental education on the next 
generation’s outcomes.  Chevalier’s study uses a change in the compulsory schooling 
requirement that took place in Britain in 1957.  He finds large effects of mother’s education on 
children’s educational attainment, but does not find statistically significant effects of father’s 
education.    Because identification is based on a single change in the minimum schooling law, 
however, he is unable to disentangle compulsory schooling effects from cohort effects.   
                                                 
4 In a related paper, Bleakely and Chin (2004) show that children of immigrant parents with stronger English 
language skills have better educational outcomes, but they do not explicitly estimate the causal effect of parental 
education.   4
Chevalier’s sample of children is also confined to those who are still living at home with their 
parents, and the distribution of educational attainment among children living at home will be 
different from that in the population. 
  Black, Devereux and Salvanes examine the effects of an increase in mandatory schooling 
from 7 to 9 years, which was phased in across municipalities in Norway between 1959 and 1973.  
Using the timing of the law changes to instrument for parental education, they find weak (but not 
statistically significant) evidence of a causal relationship between parental education and 
children’s outcomes.  They do find however, that among mothers with low levels of education, 
the mandated increase in education had a statistically significant effect on their children’s 
educational attainment.     
  The larger variation in compulsory school law changes in the United States, and the 
larger samples from the U.S. Censuses enable us to arrive at much more precise estimates than  
the Norwegian analysis.  Institutional differences across countries may also lead to different 
results.  Cross-country comparisons of intergenerational mobility find that Americans exhibit 
less mobility than most Europeans [Bjorklund et al.(2002); Solon (1999)].  Finally, the Black et 
al. estimates may be downward biased because all of the children in the sample are subject to the 
9 year schooling requirement, whereas only some of the parents are affected by the change in the 
law.  We are able to avoid this because we focus on children’s grade retention instead of 
completed education.  
 
III. Empirical Strategy 
 Let  if y denote a relevant outcome for child i living in family f. Suppose that the true 
model for  if y is   5
 
if f f f if X MothEd FathEd y ε β β β α + + + + = 3 2 1       ( 1 )  
 
where  f FathEd  and  f MothEd  indicate the educational attainment of the child’s father and 
mother,  f X is a vector of all the other family background characteristics that affect the child’s 
outcome, and  if ε is an error term representing the effects of individual specific factors that are 
uncorrelated with family background.  If we could observe everything that belongs in X then 
estimates of  1 β  and  2 β  would capture the effects of parents’ educational attainment that are 
independent of their other characteristics.   Because this is not possible, we address the omitted 
variables problem by using U.S. compulsory school laws as instruments for completed 
education.  Lleras-Muney (2002), Schmidt (1996) and Goldin and Katz (2003) have documented 
the effectiveness of these laws from 1910 to 1940, specifically examining the effects of the latest 
age allowed before requiring school entry, the minimum school leaving age, and the minimum 
age at which a child could obtain a work permit to exempt her from school.  All three studies 
conclude that these laws had modest, but statistically significant effects on educational 
attainment.  For example, Goldin and Katz (2003) conclude that changes in compulsory school 
legislation over this 30-year period account for about 5 percent of the more than doubling of 
secondary school enrollment.   
  Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) have also collected and recorded information on 
compulsory schooling laws between 1915 and 1969, and have used them to estimate both 
individual and social returns to education.  They simplify the laws by converting them into two 
variables: the minimum length of time required in school before being allowed to leave, and the 
minimum length of time required in school before being allowed to obtain a work permit.  While   6
both types of laws were influential, work exemptions often allowed students to leave school 
before the minimum school leaving age.  Recognizing this, our instruments are based on the 
minimum number of years of schooling required in order to obtain a work permit and we use 
Acemoglu and Angrist’s data collection and simplification.
5  Estimates based on school leaving 
age restrictions are very similar.
6  In the following section, we describe more precisely how we 
utilize their information on the laws. 
  In practice, the model we estimate is slightly more restrictive than equation (1) because 
we use the sum of mother’s and father’s completed education as the key regressor instead of 
including each parent’s education separately.  When we include each parent’s education 
separately in the same regression, the standard error estimates that are produced are too large to 
be able to discern differences between the effects of mother’s and father’s education.  This is 
because the instruments for fathers’ and mothers’ education, (the compulsory schooling laws), 
are very highly correlated.  We have also conducted separate analyses of the effects of mothers’ 
and fathers’ education, recognizing that if mother’s and father’s educational attainment are 
correlated then the estimated education coefficient in each regression will also reflect the effect 
of the omitted parent’s schooling level.  Since separate analyses complicate the interpretation of 
the education coefficients, we instead use the sum of parents’ completed education as the 
regressor of interest, which allows us to directly estimate the effect of a one year increase in 
either parent’s schooling level.
7  Total parental education is approximately twice as large in two-
                                                 
5 The variables collected by Acemoglu and Angrist, Goldin and Katz, and Lleras-Muney are very similar. Using 
these alternative sets of compulsory schooling variables for our analysis yields very similar IV estimates.  We chose 
to work with Acemoglu and Angrist’s laws because they allowed us to examine parents from a wider range of birth 
cohorts. 
6 Available from the authors. 
7 Of course, this specification assumes that the effect of father’s education and mother’s education are the same.  As 
discussed above, the compulsory schooling laws do not vary enough between parents to determine whether the 
effects are, in fact, different. Results with regressions run separately for mothers and fathers are provided in 
Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens (2003).    7
parent families as in single-parent families, so we estimate separate regressions for the two 
groups, noting that our estimates will not capture any indirect effect of education on children via 
family structure.
8 
  A related issue is that changes in education induced by the compulsory schooling laws 
could also affect fertility, and thus alter the sample of children we observe.  McCrary and Royer 
(2005) find no evidence that education affects fertility, but Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2004) 
find that compulsory schooling laws have a negative effect on the probability of having a child as 
a teenager.  Using a sample of 15-60 year old heads and spouses from the 1960-1980 Censuses, 
we find no evidence that compulsory schooling laws affect the probability of being a parent.  
This suggests that while the laws may affect the timing of fertility, they do not affect the 
probability of ending up in our sample.  Since we condition on the age of the parents, our 
estimated education coefficients will not reflect the effects of early childbearing. 
We aggregate our data by parental state of birth, parental birth cohort, and census year.
9 
10  This approach recognizes that our identifying variation occurs at the parental state of birth by 
birth cohort level.  After generating cell means for all variables in the regression specification, 
we estimate the following first-stage equation:   
14 , 3 14 , 2 14 , 1 14 , 3 14 , 2 14 , 1 0 9 8 7 9 8 7 + + + + + + + + + + + + = m l m l n l k j k j k j yjklm CL CL CL CL CL CL ParEd η η η γ γ γ α
          lm jk m l k j y yjklm u u u u X µ µ µ φ + + + + + + + +          (2) 
                                                 
8 We have used our sample to estimate IV regressions of the probability of living in a two-parent family on mother’s 
education (using the compulsory schooling variables as instruments) and find that education has no effect on marital 
status. The coefficient estimate is -0.007 and the standard error estimate is 0.006. 
9 We have also run individual level regressions, regressions that are based on aggregation to the parental state and 
year of birth only, and regressions in which the cells are defined by parental state of birth/parental year of 
birth/census year and child’s state of residence.  The latter specification allows us to include state fixed effects, 
which control for differences in educational quality experienced by children across states.  These specifications all 
produce very similar estimates. 
10 We aggregate separately by census year because we wish to include census year fixed effects, which control for 
changes in completed education as the cohorts age across census years, along with minor differences across survey 
instruments.   8
where  yjklm ParEd  is average parental (the sum of mother’s and father’s) education for youths 
observed in census year y, with fathers from state  j  born in year k , and mothers from state l 
born in year m . The vector X includes variables that capture the child group’s percent black and 
Asian, percent female and average age.  We also include fixed effects for the relevant census 
year, parent’s state of birth and parent’s year of birth. In the second-stage we estimate: 
yjk m l k j y yjklm yjklm yjk X ParEd y ε ε ε ε ε ε δ δ δ + + + + + + + + = 2 1 0      (3) 
where  yjklm y  is the average child outcome for each cell.  Standard errors in each stage will be 
estimated using Huber-White and clustering by parent’s state and year of birth.
11  The excluded 
instruments are the dummy variables CL7, CL8, and CL9 (for each parent) which denote 
required years of schooling prior to obtaining a work permit of 7, 8, or 9 or more years.  More 
detail on these variables is given in the data section.     
Identifying the effects of the compulsory schooling laws on parental education is made 
possible through differences in the timing of the changes in these laws across states.  One 
concern is that states that raised compulsory schooling requirements might also be those that did 
a better job of educating the second generation.  Consider, for example, how changes in the 
educational attainment of adults in the child’s state, brought on by changes in compulsory 
schooling laws, might affect support for programs that improve the quality of schools. If more 
highly educated adults are more likely to support school taxes, and higher school expenditures 
affect children’s human capital then compulsory schooling laws will not allow us to isolate the 
effect of growing up in a more educated family from the effect of growing up in a more educated 
community.  Fortunately, the literature suggests that any “spillover” effects of the laws are small.  
Goldin and Katz (2003), for example, find that compulsory schooling laws only explain about 
                                                 
11 Clustering at the state level does not affect inference.   9
5% of the convergence in educational attainment between 1915 and 1940.  In addition, the laws 
appear to have had no impact on educational attainment beyond 12
th grade.  This, combined with 
the fact that those affected by a change in the law will comprise only a small fraction of the total 
stock of adults, suggests that changes in compulsory schooling had minimal affects on the 
education level of the adults in the child’s community.  Furthermore, Acemoglu and Angrist 
(2000) find little evidence that education generates positive externalities (in the form of higher 
wages).  Nevertheless, we take the possibility of instrument endogeniety seriously and employ a 
number of strategies to verify that our compulsory schooling variables are not picking up the 




IV.A. Census Data 
Our analysis uses data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) created 
by the Census Bureau.  The IPUMS consists of individual and household level data from the 
decennial census, and includes nearly all of the detail originally recorded by the census 
enumerations.  Information exists at the individual level on a broad range of individual 
characteristics, including fertility, marital status, immigration, labor-force participation, income, 
occupational structure, education, ethnicity and household composition.  We use the 1% samples 
from the 1960, 1970 and 1980 Censuses, which creates for us a dataset of 711,072 children 
living in two parent families and 129,632 children living in single parent families.  The size of 
our dataset is an enormous advantage in terms of enabling us to obtain precise estimates.   10
  The main disadvantage of the IPUMS, and the reason that it has not been used for 
intergenerational mobility studies, is that it is a cross-sectional dataset that contains little 
information on children’s outcomes.   It does, however, contain information on each individual’s 
level of educational attainment.  We use this information, together with information on the 
child’s age to determine whether or not she has repeated a grade.  Grade repetition is a 
widespread phenomenon in the United States and is correlated with many, more commonly used, 
measures of educational achievement and socioeconomic success.
12    This suggests that if we 
can obtain estimates of the causal effect of parental education on the probability that a child 
repeats a grade, we will also gain insight into the causal relationship between parental education 
and children’s long-run success. 
  Determining whether or not a child has repeated a grade is complicated by the fact that 
there is variation across states and over time in the minimum age at school entry, incomplete 
information on school entry cut-off dates across states and over time, and questions about the 
degree to which school districts comply with those dates.
13   We classify a child as a repeater if 
her educational attainment is below the median for her state, age, quarter-of-birth and census 
year cell.   Details about the construction of this measure and alternative classification schemes 
can be found in the Appendix.  Our results are not sensitive to the particular measure we use. It is 
                                                 
12 A report from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, for example, indicates that over 20% of 
American adolescents have repeated a grade (Resnick, et.al. 1997), and Feldman (1997) estimates that in many 
urban districts more than half of all students will be retained.  There is also evidence that grade retention is 
correlated with other measures of children’s success.  The National Center for Education Statistics (1997) estimates 
that approximately one quarter of young adults who had repeated a grade had dropped out of school by 1995.  
Similarly, Smith and Shepard (1989) find that students who have previously repeated a grade tend to have worse 
academic outcomes than similar students who have not repeated a grade. 
13 We have collected state level information on minimum school entry ages and cut-off dates for 1955 and 
1965: 43 states in 1955 and 32 states in 1965.  Twenty two states maintained the same cutoff dates over the ten year 
period and 7 states changed their cutoff-date.  Missing information prevents us from determining what happened in 
the remaining states.  Incorporating this information into our definition of grade repetition  does not alter our 
measure.  One reason for this is that we know quarter of birth, but not month of birth, and so variation in entry cut-
offs from October to December, for example, does not help us to further distinguish potential repeaters.  
   11
important to note, however, that our measure includes children who enter school late, even if 
they are never held back.  For this reason, it may be more appropriate to think of our dependent 
variable as a measure of grade-for-age.   
The analysis focuses on children between the ages of 7 and 15 years of age.  Children 
younger than age 7 are not included because they are not old enough to have had the opportunity 
to repeat a grade.  We exclude children older than age 15 in order to avoid over-representing 
children that left home at late ages.  To adjust for the fact that older sample members have had 
more of an opportunity to repeat a grade, and to adjust for possible gender differences in grade 
repetition, all of our regressions include controls for age and gender.  Summary statistics for our 
samples are shown in Appendix Table 1. 
 
IV.B. Compulsory Schooling Laws 
  Data on compulsory schooling law have previously been collected by Acemoglu and 
Angrist, and by Lleras-Muney.  Lleras-Muney’s collection of compulsory schooling data is 
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~alleras/papers.htm. The Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) 
data we utilize are summarized in more detail in their appendix.  As noted above, we follow 
earlier authors by using a variable designed to capture the minimum number of years of 
schooling that would be required before an individual is eligible for a work permit.  Specifically, 
we use the following variable to instrument for education: 
CL=max{required years of schooling before receiving a work permit; minimum age required for 
a work permit-enrollment age}   12
In order to capture a potentially non-linear relationship between years of schooling 
required and educational attainment, we use the CL variable to create dummy variables of the 
form: 
CL6 =1 for CL ≤ 6, and 0 otherwise 
CL7 =1 for CL = 7, and 0 otherwise 
CL8 =1 for CL = 8, and 0 otherwise 
CL9 =1 for CL ≥  9, and 0 otherwise 
These dummies are matched to parents in our sample based on the school entry laws that 
were in place in their state of birth when they were 6 years old and the school leaving laws that 
were in place when they were 14 years old.  We chose these as the relevant matching years  
because they are the lowest common entry and leaving ages across states.  Although we would 
prefer to match according to the parents’ state of residence at ages 6 and 14, that information is 
not available in the Census.  This inevitably leads to some mismatches, but the resulting errors 
are unlikely to be correlated with the laws because the laws were not likely a motivating factor 




V.A. First-stage Results 
  Before turning to our IV estimates, we look at the results from the first stage, in which we 
regress parental education an compulsory schooling laws.  Table 1 shows the frequencies of   13
compulsory schooling laws over time.
14  For example, in 1940 there were 7 states that required 
seven or fewer years of schooling, 14 states that required exactly eight years of schooling and 26 
states that required nine years.  Moreover, between 1915 and 1970, required years increased to 
more than seven in 29 states while 24 states increased the required number of years to more than 
10.  About one-third of the variation in the laws is across-states and about two-thirds is within 
states over time.   
  Table 2 provides the coefficient estimates that are produced by equation 2, along with the 
partial R
2 and the F-statistic for the hypothesis that the compulsory schooling laws are jointly 
equal to zero.  Looking first at the relationship between the laws and married parents’ 
educational attainment, we see that the coefficient estimates on the compulsory schooling 
dummies increase monotonically (as expected) and are all statistically significant.  Importantly, 
given our goal of using this relationship as the basis for our instrumental variables strategy, the 
F-statistic on the joint test of instrument significance is 84, which is well above the cut-off value 
suggested by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997). A value of less than 
5 would raise concerns that our instruments were only weakly correlated with the endogenous 
regressor.  The partial R
2 on our instruments is 0.003.  
  To verify that the compulsory schooling laws are affecting parental education in the 
expected way, we separate the sample on the basis of the parents’ completed education.  Since 
compulsory schooling laws never mandate high school completion, we do not expect the law 
changes to have an effect on educational attainment beyond high school.  The relationship that 
we see for the full sample in Table 2 should therefore break down when looking only at those 
parents who had more than a high school education.  For the subsample of children whose 
                                                 
14 The table includes the number of states that are included in our sample for each year.  We are missing compulsory 
schooling data for Alaska and Hawaii.  The table omits additional states in a few years because our sample of 
children does not always include a match with a particular parental state/year cell.   14
parents both obtained fewer than 12 years of schooling (column 2), all of the relevant statistics 
are similar to those for the full sample. Among children whose parents each received some post-
secondary schooling, however (column 3), the compulsory schooling dummies show no evidence 
of being correlated with higher levels of educational attainment.  The partial R
2 on the 
instruments is smaller than for less educated parents, and the F-statistic falls to 2.6. This suggests 
that compulsory schooling laws are not picking up more general state-level changes in 
educational attainment.
15  The first-stage estimates for heads in single parent families look very 
similar to those for two parent families, including the pattern of results across more and less 
educated parents.  These first-stage estimates suggest that compulsory schooling laws are 
strongly correlated with levels of educational attainment. 
 
V.B. Reduced Form Results  
  Table 3 provides the reduced form estimates, obtained by regressing children’s 
educational progress on the compulsory schooling dummies.    The first-stage effects of are 
strong enough to observe a substantive reduced form effect on children’s grade repetition.   
Children whose fathers were required to stay in school for 7 years were 1.1 percentage points 
less likely to repeat a grade, on average, than those whose parents faced more lenient schooling 
requirements.  The pattern of the estimates is also in keeping with what one would expect: 
children whose parents were required to stay in school more years generally experienced larger 
                                                 
15 We leave out those children whose parents have exactly 12 years of education because it is unclear how we would 
expect the education levels of these parents to have been affected by the change in the laws.  On the one hand, since 
the laws do not ever mandate that an individual complete high school, we would expect the laws to have minimal 
explanatory power among parents with 12 or more years of schooling.  On the other hand, individuals obliged to 
continue high school may perceive the costs of graduation to be smaller than if they could have left school earlier, 
and may, therefore, decide to stay on until they obtain a degree.  When we conduct our analyses by education 
category but include the parents with exactly 12 years of schooling our results are similar to those we present here.   15
human capital gains.  This pattern is similar when we use the laws faced by married mothers and 
single parents. 
  First stage and reduced form results for parents with less than 12 years of schooling are 
shown graphically in Figure 1.  Since mothers and fathers may be exposed to different laws, we 
split the two-parent sample into two: i) a matched child-father sample, and ii) a matched child-
mother sample, and then stack these two datasets together with the dataset containing children 
from single-parent families.
16  The combined sample is then aggregated by parent’s state of birth, 
parent’s year of birth, and census year, and includes only the cohorts of parents who turned 14 
during the twenty year period surrounding an increase in the state’s schooling requirement.   
Parent’s average level of education and children’s average rate of grade repetition are regressed 
on dummy variables indicating the 10 years before and 10 years after the change,
17  The thick 
black line shows the estimated coefficients for the years around the law change among the 
sample of parents (scaled on the left-hand axis), and the thinner line shows comparable estimates 
for the children (scaled on the right-hand axis). The omitted category year is the year of the law 
change.   
  This figure shows a clear break in both average parental education and average grade 
retention following the introduction of a more restrictive compulsory schooling law. Average 
schooling among parents who were aged 14 ten years after a law change is about .15 years higher 
than among those who were 14 in the year of the law change.
18  The figure is important because 
it makes clear that increases in educational attainment follow changes in compulsory schooling 
                                                 
16 If we were to use this sample as the basis for our regression analysis then we would, of course, need to adjust the 
standard error estimates to account for the fact that we observe some of the children twice. 
17 We also include fixed effects for parent’s state of birth, birth cohort, and census year. 
18 To keep the figure clean, the standard error bounds are not shown.  For all lead and lag coefficients for the 
parental education regression, the standard errors are about .04.  The standard errors are about .006 for the grade 
retention regression.    16
rather than the other way around.  Similarly, the timing of the fall in average grade retention 
rates occurs concurrently with the change in compulsory schooling (and average parental 
education).  The grade repetition rate falls by about .01 (1 percentage point).  Dividing this fall 
by the average increase in parental years of schooling gives a rough estimate of the effect of an 
additional year of compulsory schooling.  The estimate (.01/.15 = .07) is roughly double the 
magnitude of our IV estimates, but our regression model uses the sum of parents’ education as 
the regressor of interest.  When we estimate the effects of mother’s and father’s education in 
separate regressions we get results that are very similar to the estimates implied by Figure 1. 
  Figure 2 shows the same coefficient estimates for the sample of parents with more than 
12 years of schooling.  Unlike the previous figure, there is no clear break in either series.  This is 
what we should expect if compulsory schooling laws only affect parents who intend to leave 
high school without graduating (assuming that the laws do not induce many of these parents to 
obtain post-secondary education).  It is not what we would expect if other factors are driving the 
discontinuity shown in Figure 1.     
 
V.C. OLS and IV Results 
  Table 4 displays our key results, beginning with the OLS estimates.  For both family 
types, parental education is strongly significantly related to children’s human capital 
accumulation.  The point estimates suggest that an additional year of education will reduce the 
probability that a child repeats a grade by 1 to 3 percentage points. The marginal effect of 
education is smaller among more highly educated parents, suggesting that the intergenerational 
return to education falls as education increases, but the estimates are still substantive and 
statistically significant.    These results are consistent with the existing literature, which has 
documented a positive intergenerational correlation between parents’ education and that of their   17
offspring.  What is unclear is the extent to which these estimates reflect a causal relationship.  To 
what degree can parents improve their children’s progress through school by investing in their 
own human capital?   
This question is addressed in the next column, where we use compulsory schooling laws 
as instruments for parental education.   The IV estimates indicate that an increase in parental 
education lowers the probability that a child is held back in school.  The point estimates suggest 
that raising parental education by one year (about a third of a standard deviation) will reduce the 
probability of their children being retained by between 2 and 4 percentage points.  The estimates 
are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
19  
20 
Like previous work that uses compulsory schooling laws as instruments, the IV estimates 
are larger than the corresponding OLS estimates (at least among two parent families).
21  The 
ratio of the IV estimate to the OLS estimate for our sample of children living in two parent 
families is 1.87.  Previous studies have produced ratios that range from 1.5 to 2.5 (Angrist and 
Krueger, 1991; Harmon and Walker, 1995; Oreopoulos, 2003; Staiger and Stock, 1997). Some 
researchers have argued that this phenomenon occurs because errors-in-variables biases 
outweigh omitted variables biases in OLS regressions.  Another explanation is that compulsory 
                                                 
19 When the effects of father’s and mother’s education are estimated in separate regressions, the resulting coefficient 
and standard error estimates are  -.059 (.007) (fathers) and -.049 (.006) (mothers).  Since these estimates reflect the 
effect of the unobserved spouse’s education as well, it is not surprising that they are approximately twice as big as 
the estimates in Table 4.  
20 We have also conducted the analysis using parents’ quarters of birth as instruments, similar to the approach 
adopted by Angrist and Krueger (1991), but using an indicator for whether a child repeated a grade as the main 
outcome (instead of earnings).  The IV estimate for two-parent families is -0.020, with a standard error estimate of 
0.004.  This result is very much in line with the estimates based on variation in compulsory schooling laws.  
However, some concern has been expressed in the literature about a possible correlation between quarter-of-birth 
and unobserved individual characteristics that might affect children’s outcomes (Bound and Jaeger, 1996). Concerns 
about these types of correlations can be addressed by interacting quarter-of-birth with year-of-birth and state-of-
birth, but then the identifying variation is very similar to the variation obtained from compulsory schooling laws.  
Previous studies have also raised concerns about the first-stage power of these interactions (Bound, Baker and 
Jaeger, 1995).  For these reasons, we chose to focus on the compulsory schooling results.   
21 The confidence intervals around the OLS estimates do not include the IV estimates, and vs. versa.  Hausman tests 
for equality of the OLS and IV estimates also reject the null of equality, but this test may not be appropriate since we 
are using clustered data.    18
schooling laws affect schooling levels at the bottom of the education distribution but not at the 
top.  The marginal effect of an additional year of schooling is likely to be larger among those 
with low skill levels, and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) note that IV estimates will reflect 
the marginal return for the group that is affected by the instrument.   
The pattern of OLS and IV estimates across family types lends some support to a Local 
Average Treatment Effect (LATE) interpretation of the results.  Relative to children from two 
parent homes, children from single parent homes are more likely to have parents who were 
affected by compulsory schooling laws.  Similarly, the fraction of children who repeat a grade is 
higher for this group.  The IV/OLS ratio is correspondingly much smaller for this sample.     
  The next panel of Table 4 shows the results from IV regressions applied to the subset of 
children whose parents both have less than 12 years of education.  While splitting the sample by 
the endogenous regressor is not an entirely legitimate practice, the evidence presented above on 
the power of the first-stage regressions suggests that the IV strategy is most appropriate for this 
group.  As expected, these estimates are similar to the estimates generated by the full sample, 
although they are no longer statistically significant for children growing up in single-parent 
families.  Also as expected, estimates based on a sample with more than 12 years of education 
are close to zero. 
While not directly comparable because of differences in the dependent variables, our 
point estimates appear to be larger and are more precisely estimated than those produced by 
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005), who find that an additional year of parental education will 
raise the child’s education by .04 to .11 of a year but whose estimates are not generally 
statistically different from zero.  As noted above, the fact that our estimated effects are 
statistically significant may reflect the greater amount of variation in compulsory schooling laws   19
in our sample, relative to the Black, el al. sample.  Another difference between our study and 
theirs is that Black et. al. consistently report IV estimates that are below their OLS estimates.  
Two possible explanations are that 1) measurement error in the Norwegian education data is 
likely very small because the data come from an administrative source, and 2) returns to 
education do not differ greatly across segments of the Norwegian population 
Since grade repetition and educational-attainment-for-age are not typical dependent 
variables, we have also used our instruments to estimate the effect of parental education on the 
probability that a child drops out of school.  Using census data on 15-18 year olds living at home, 
we construct a variable that is equal to one if the child is not currently enrolled in school and has 
not completed 12 or more years of schooling, and we create the same measure for a sub-sample 
of 15-16 year olds.    Because the census files only allow us to look at outcomes for children 
while they are in the same household as a parent, the high school drop-out variable is not ideal:  
dropping out of school is likely to be correlated with moving out of a parents’ household.  As a 
result, the analysis will suffer from selection bias.  Despite this concern, we present some results 
using dropout status as our dependent variable, with the caveat that the effects shown here cannot 
be generalized to the entire population of 15-18 year olds.  Selection issues may be less severe 
for the sample of 15-16 year olds.
 22 
The results from this exercise are presented in Table 5.  Across all samples, and 
regardless of the measure of parental education used, there is a negative and (with one exception) 
statistically significant relationship between parents’ education and the probability of dropping 
out of high school.  As with our analysis of grade repetition, the IV estimates are larger in 
absolute value than the OLS estimates, and suggest a significant causal relationship running from 
                                                 
22 Roughly 95% of 15 year olds in the Census live with at least one parent, but only 77% of 15 year-old high school 
dropouts live with a parent.  At age 17, these fractions fall to 88% of all 17 year olds, and 67% of 17 year old 
dropouts.   20
parental education to children’s educational attainment.  Among 15-18 year olds, these estimates 
suggest that an additional year of parental education reduces the probability of dropping out by 2 
to 3 percentage points.  The mean drop-out rate for this sample is .07 among two parent 
households, and .13 among single parent households.  There is also evidence that sample 
selection affects the estimates.  The coefficient estimates fall (in absolute value) when we limit 
the sample to 15 and 16 year olds, who are more likely to be observed living with a parent.  This 
might be expected if children not living with their parents are also less influenced by parental 
characteristics and resources.   The fact that drop-out rates increase as age increases from 15 to 
18 could also account for such a pattern.  
These estimated effects are large relative to the mean drop-out rate in our sample.  It 
seems likely, however, that typical drop-out rates among children whose parents were affected 
by compulsory schooling laws are substantially higher than average.  The average drop-out rate 
among children of fathers with less than a high school education, for example, is .12, compared 
with .07 for the full sample.  While we do not wish to draw any strong conclusions from the 
drop-out analysis given the sample selection issues involved, the results in Table 5 are consistent 
with those produced by our main analysis.  Higher parental education appears to result in 
improved educational outcomes for children. 
 
V.E.  Further Investigation of Instrument Exogeneity  
   An important set of concerns with our identification strategy is that the instruments may 
be correlated with other state-level changes that affect children’s progress through school.  It is 
important to remember that since the relevant compulsory schooling laws pertain to the year that 
the parent turned 14, such state-level changes would have to have an effect on children’s   21
outcomes approximately twenty years later.   We have also demonstrated that compulsory 
schooling laws only affect educational attainment among parents with low skills, which suggests 
that they are not picking up a more general state trend.  Nevertheless, in this section we devote 
our attention to a number of additional robustness checks.  
First, we add a variety of state-year controls to our regressions.  The additional variables 
are motivated by Lleras-Muney (2005) who explores the possibility that compulsory schooling 
laws are endogenous with respect to educational attainment.  Specifically, we include the state 
population, the number of doctors per capita, the value per acre of farm land, the percent of the 
state population that is foreign born, the percent of the state population that is black, the fraction 
of the state population living in urban areas, the fraction who are manufacturing workers, and 
average manufacturing wages per worker.  These controls are aligned with the parent’s state of 
birth and the year he/she turned 14. The results from this exercise are displayed in Table 6.  
Inclusion of the state/year controls has virtually no effect on the estimated effect of parental 
education and the first-stage F-statistics remain strong.
23  The estimates are also robust to the 
inclusion of regional trends, although the standard error estimates also increase.   
When we add state-specific trends to the model (column 4), we find that the estimated 
impact of parental education becomes even larger, although the estimated effects among single 
parent families are no longer statistically significant. Inclusion of state-specific trends greatly 
reduces the first-stage power of the instruments, however, because most states experienced both 
upward trends in educational attainment and increases in compulsory schooling requirements.  
Our inability to separately identify the effects of the laws on parental education from the effects 
                                                 
23 The estimated coefficients in the single-parent sample are hardly affected by the inclusion of state controls, but the 
estimated standard error increases so that the statistical significance of the estimates is reduced.   22
of other trends does not put our concerns about identification to rest,
24 and so we conduct two 
additional exercises.  
First, we replicate our analysis using the subset of states and years for which there was 
either a decrease or no change in the minimum required years of schooling.  To do this, we 
create a subsample of state/year cells from the five years prior to a decline in the minimum 
schooling requirement through the five years following the change.
25  L i k e  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
country, these states experienced a positive trend in average educational attainment, but because 
their compulsory schooling laws were moving in the opposite direction, IV estimates based on 
this sample are less likely to be driven by an underlying trend.  Table 7 shows that restricting the 
sample in this way actually increases the magnitude of the estimates. 
Second, we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to an alternative identification 
strategy that is based entirely on cross-sectional variation.  Note that there is a difference 
between the environment in which parents’ and children’s educational outcomes are determined 
when children and their parents grow up in different states.  If we compare outcomes among 
children living in the same state and whose parents belong to the same birth cohort, but were 
educated in different states from their children, then the identifying variation cannot be 
contaminated by parental state-of-birth trends.  Specifically, consider the following individual-
level first stage regression:     
                                                 
24 Following a referee’s suggestion, we have also tried a specification that controls for state trends by taking some of 
the predetermined state characteristics included in column 1 of Table 6 and interacting them with year dummies.  
The variables we chose were percent black, percent urban, and the manufacturing wage, because these variables are 
strongly correlated with the parent’s schooling.  This specification produces a first-stage F-statistic on the excluded 
instrument of 8.3, and a second stage coefficient estimate of -.018 (0.007) for dual-parent families, and -0.017 
(0.024) for single-parent families. 
25 If a state experienced an increase in required years of schooling during the five year period after the initial law 
change then it is dropped from the sample. If a second decline in required years occurred during the five year period 
then the state is included in the sample.    23
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Where i refers to an individual child who resides in state s and all other subscripts are the same 
as in equation (3).  We also include interactions between state of residence and parent’s birth 
cohort, dummies for parent’s region of birth, and the set of observable characteristics of the 
parent’s state of birth included in Table 6.  Note that in this specification we use 3-year birth 
cohort dummies (rather than single year cohorts) to preserve reasonable cell-sizes and reduce the 
required number of interactions.    The sample is now restricted to “movers.”  The second stage 
regression contains the same sets of controls, except for the compulsory schooling laws.  Since 
the children are not living in the same state in which their parents were educated, estimates 
produced by this exercise are based only on cross-sectional variation in the laws. 
The first column of Table 8 shows what happens to our estimates when we apply our 
original identification strategy to this new sample of movers.  Among dual parent families, the 
estimates are very similar to those produced by the full sample.  The estimates are much noisier 
for single parent families because restricting the sample to movers reduces the sample size 
dramatically.  In addition, the first stage F-statistic falls below 2 which suggests that, for single 
parent families, this exercise will not be informative.  
Column 2 shows the results produced by the alternative identification strategy. Among 
two parent families, the estimates are very similar to those in column 1.  They remain statistically 
different from zero, and suggest that a one year increase in parental education will reduce the 
probability of repeating a grade by approximately two percentage points.  It is striking that we 
find similar, positive and statistically significant effects (among two parent families) whether our 
identification is confined to cross-sectional or time-series variation. 
   24
VI.  Conclusion 
  This paper  provides new evidence on the causal effect of parental education across 
generations.  The limited literature on the intergenerational effects of parental education has 
struggled to find appropriate identification strategies; we draw on variation in compulsory 
schooling laws, which are arguably exogenous with respect to children’s outcomes fifteen or 
more years later.  Using data from the 1960-1980 Census files, we estimate that an increase in 
parental education of one year will reduce a child’s probability of being at grade-for-age by 2 to 
4 percentage points.  Since grade retention is negatively correlated with other academic 
outcomes, the positive effect of parental education on children’s grade progression is likely to 
have long-term socio-economic benefits as well. 
  Identification of a causal effect of parental education implies that at least some of the 
intergenerational transmission of inequality can be attributed to environmental influences.  We 
have identified a significantly large environmental effect.  There are several possible 
mechanisms that could explain this relationship, although disentangling which environmental 
factors drive these results cannot be determined using this paper’s research design.  Parental 
income is an obvious possibility.  Our results and others [e.g. Oreopoulos (2003), Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2000)] show large gains in earnings from additional compulsory schooling.  With 
additional earnings, wealthier parents can afford better schools, better neighborhoods, and better 
nutrition.  Currie and Stabile (2004), for example, find that children from low income families 
are more likely to experience frequent cases of poor health and low test scores.  Mulligan (1997) 
suggests wealthier parents are more likely to care about their children’s development.   
Parental education may also affect children in ways other than through income.  More 
educated parents may have more favorable attitudes toward school.  The additional skills   25
acquired may also improve child development.  Magnuson (2003), discusses several additional 
avenues by which parental education might improve children’s education.  Specifically, she 
notes that parents with more education may have “better” parenting and teaching styles, may 
engage their children in higher quality verbal interactions and literacy activities, may provide 
more stimulating learning opportunities in the home, and may simply be more comfortable 
interacting with teachers and educational institutions. 
Our results draw attention to the social externalities that are associated with education.  
While much research has been devoted to understanding the private returns to education via 
individual wage effects, designing effective education policy hinges crucially on taking the full 
social costs and benefits into account.  There is increasing evidence that the social returns to 
education are substantial
26 and our estimates suggest yet another dimension along which positive 
externalities occur.  Taken together, these findings indicate that the total returns to education 
may be seriously underrepresented by estimates that focus only on individual wage effects. 
                                                 
26 Currie and Moretti, 2003; Moretti, 2004; Lochner and Moretti, 2004.   26
  
Appendix 
Determining whether or not a child has repeated a grade is complicated by the fact that there 
is variation across states and over time in the minimum age at school entry, incomplete 
information on school entry cut-off dates across states and over time, and questions about the 
degree to which school districts comply with those dates.  We have collected state level 
information on the minimum school entry age and cut-off dates for 1955-1965:  43 states in 1955 
and 32 states in 1965.  Twenty two states maintained the same cutoff dates over the ten year 
period and 7 states changed their cutoff-date.  Missing information prevents us from determining 
what happened in the remaining states.  Since we do not have school entry cutoff dates for each 
state and year, we have created several different measures for assessing “normal” educational 
progress.     
One possible measure of grade retention is based on the assumption that all states use 
October 1 as their cut-off.  We treat all children who turned six in the first three quarters of the 
calendar year as though they entered first grade in the fall of that year, and all children who 
turned six in the fourth quarter as though they entered first grade in the fall of the following year.  
The estimated effect of parental education using this measure is very similar to the one we 
highlight in the paper, which is based on an alternative measure that classifies children whose 
educational attainment is below the median for their state, age, quarter of birth, and census year 
cell as below grade-for-age (<MEDIAN-GRD).    This second measure takes into account year 
and state specific characteristics (such as the current cohort’s likely enrollment cutoff date) and 
individual level characteristics (quarter of birth) that affect the age at which the child was likely 
to have enrolled in school.  Because individuals’ completed education levels are heavily   27
clustered at the median, about 10-15% of children in each cell are classified as repeaters.  These 
percentages are similar to those reported in the literature.  
  Our measure of grade retention is not perfect.  Students who entered school late, for 
example, will be classified as having been held back, and delayed entry into kindergarten is a 
fairly common practice.  Nine percent of first and second graders in the mid-1990’s had entered 
kindergarten late, whereas only 5-6% had repeated kindergarten (National Center for Education 
Statistics, 1995).  In a recent paper, Cascio (2003) compares directly reported measures of grade 
repetition  in the 1992, 1995 and 1999 Current Population Survey School Enrollment 
Supplement to a below grade proxy created using educational attainment data available in the 
Census. She finds that about 20% of all children are incorrectly classified by the below grade 
proxy, and that about 94% of such errors are comprised of children who have not repeated a 
grade but who are classified as such by the proxy.  For this reason, it is more appropriate to think 
of our dependent variable as a measure of grade-for-age. 
  Normally, researchers are not concerned that noisy dependent variables will generate 
biased estimates because measurement error in a normally distributed dependent variable merely 
generates inefficient standard error estimates.  Cascio points out, however, that when the 
dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the individual has repeated a grade, then 
consistency may be a problem.  Measurement error in a binary dependent variable will produce 
attenuated parameter estimates (Aigner, 1973; Hausman, 2001).  Cascio estimates that the 
attenuation factor that results from using dependent variables like <MEDIAN-GRD may be as 
high as 0.35.  While we would prefer to generate unbiased estimates, downward biased estimates 
will still be informative because our prior is that the intergenerational correlation captures effects 
that are not wholly causal.  Therefore, estimates that are statistically different from zero will still   28
allow us to reject the hypothesis that there is not an exogenous effect of parental education on 
children’s human capital.   Also,  although  <MEDIAN-GRD is binary, it is a less noisy 
variable than more commonly used measures of grade repetition (such as those that assume the 
same school entry cut-off dates across states) because it takes into account variation in state, age 
and quarter of birth by normalizing attainment within each cell.  Specifications based on this 
measure, therefore, should suffer less from attenuation bias than those that are commonly used in 
the literature. 
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Figure 1 
Parental Education Attainment and Child Grade Repetition Rate 
by Years Before and After Increase in Mandatory School Years Faced by Parents 
 









































Notes:  The extracts discussed in the text are combined for mothers, fathers, 
and single parents whose highest grade attainment was less than 12.  Data are 
aggregated by parent’s state of birth, parent’s year of birth, and census year.  
The sample includes only parent birth cohorts 10 years before or 10 years 
after an increase in the state’s mandatory school years, determined when a 
parent was age 6 for entry laws and age 14 for leaving laws.  Parent’s 
average grade attainment and child’s average grade repetition rate are 
regressed on 10 leads and 10 lags for the number of years between an 
increase in a state’s mandatory school years when a parent was in school, 
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Figure 2 
Parental Education Attainment and Child Grade Repetition Rate 
by Years Before and After Increase in Mandatory School Years Faced by Parents 
 



































Notes:  The extracts discussed in the text are combined for mothers, fathers, 
and single parents whose highest grade attainment was more than 12.  Data 
are aggregated by parent’s state of birth, parent’s year of birth, and census 
year.  The sample includes only parent birth cohorts 10 years before or 10 
years after an increase in the state’s mandatory school years, determined 
when a parent was age 6 for entry laws and age 14 for leaving laws.  Parent’s 
average grade attainment and child’s average grade repetition rate are 
regressed on 10 leads and 10 lags for the number of years between an 
increase in a state’s mandatory school years when a parent was in school, 


















































-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Leads and Lags before Compulsory School Year Increase...
Parent's Highest Grade
Child Repeated Grade 
Total States 
observed
1915 32 46 47 47
1920 30 47 47 47
1925 15 33 48 49
1930 14 29 48 49
1935 9 21 48 49
1940 7 21 47 49
1945 7 21 47 49
1950 5 15 34 49
1955 3 15 32 49
1960 4 12 31 49
1965 3 11 29 49
1970 3 9 23 41
Table 1
State Mandatory Schooling Laws by Year
Number of States with Mandatory Years of:
years   7   ≤ years   9   ≤ years   8   ≤Years of schooling required 
before work permit all <12th Grade >12th Grade all <12th Grade >12th Grade
Father 7 years 0.320 0.286 0.158 0.282 0.123 0.185
(0.057) (0.066) (0.033) (0.080) (0.075) (0.074)
 8  years 0.443 0.282 0.011 0.464 0.348 0.029
(0.051) (0.064) (0.057) (0.072) (0.067) (0.064)
 9  years 0.723 0.543 0.095 0.733 0.547 0.085
0.066 0.086 0.077 0.085 0.085 0.081
Mother 7 years 0.304 0.311 -0.030
0.061 0.072 0.065
  
8 years 0.470 0.473 -0.034
0.054 0.067 0.058
9 years 0.748 0.646 0.027
(0.069) (0.086) (0.077)
Initial Sample Size
# of Cells 182,072 58,692 43,102 5,249 4,630 3,376
Adj. R2 0.341 0.334 0.096 0.690 0.552 0.248
Adj. R2 without instruments 0.338 0.331 0.095 0.682 0.544 0.247
F-Test: Instruments = 0 84.4 31.14 2.61 32.2 21 3.3
Sum(Fathers'+Mothers' Ed) Head's Ed
Table 2
First Stage: Effects of Compulsory Schooling Laws on Parents' Education
Dual Parent Families Single Parent Families
Dependent Variable: Parents' Highest Grade of Schooling:
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year. Additional controls
include percent black, percent asian, percent female and percent of children at each age in each cell. Data are grouped
into means by parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year, and weighted by cell population size. Huber-White
standard errors are shown from clustering by birth cohort and state of birth. The ommited compulsory school law
variable indicates whether the minimum years of schooling required before able to obtain a work permit was 6 or less.
Samples include all children aged 7 to 15 with U.S. born parents aged 14 between 1915 and 1969. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.   See text for more data specifics.Dual Parent Single Parent
Families Families
Years of schooling required  <MEDIAN <MEDIAN
before work permit GRD GRD
Fathers 7 years -0.011  
(0.003)





Mothers 7 years -0.005 -0.009
0.003 (0.007)
8 years -0.008 -0.015
0.003 (0.006)
9 years -0.013 -0.020
0.004 (0.008)
    
 
# of cells 182,072 5,249
Table 3
Reduced Form Effects of Parents' Compulsory Schooling 
Laws on Children's Educational Attainment
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth
year, state of birth, and census year. Additional controls
include percent black, percent asian, percent female and
percent of children at each age in each cell. Data are grouped
into means by parent's birth year, state of birth, and census
year, and weighted by cell population size.  Huber-White Dependent Var:  < MEDIAN GRD OLS IV # of cells
 
Dual Parent: Sum of Parents' Education -0.014 -0.026 182,072
(0.0002) (0.002)
Single Parent: Household Head's Education -0.026 -0.027 5,249
(0.0020) (0.009)
Dual Parent: Sum of Parents' Education -0.022 -0.037 58,692
(0.0005) (0.007)
Single Parent: Household Head's Education -0.024 -0.021 4,630
(0.0020) (0.016)
Dual Parent: Sum of Parents' Education -0.004 -0.003 43,102
(0.0005) (.022)
Single Parent: Household Head's Education -0.008 0.098 3,376
(0.0030) (0.104)
Parent's Education > 12 years
Full Sample
Parent's Education < 12 years
Table 4
OLS and IV Estimates of Effect of Parent's Education on Children's Education
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and census
year. Additional controls include percent black, percent asian, percent female and average
age of the children in each cell. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by
birth cohort and state of birth. Samples include all children aged 7 to 15 with U.S. born
parents aged 14 between 1915 and 1969. Standard errors are in parenthesis. See text for
more data specifics.Mean Number of
Dropouts OLS IV Cells
Dual Parent: Sum of Parents'  Education 0.07 -0.009 -0.021 102,507
(0.000) (0.002)
Single Parent: Household Head 0.134 -0.020 -0.029 4,065
(0.002) (0.008)
Dual Parent: Sum of Parents'  Education 0.046 -0.006 -0.010 74,703
(0.000) (0.013)
Single Parent: Household Head 0.082 -0.013 -0.025 3,817
(0.002) (0.011)




Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year. Additional controls
include percent black, percent asian, percent female and average age of the children in each cell. Data are grouped into
means by parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year, and weighted by cell population size. Huber-White standard
errors are shown from clustering by birth cohort and state of birth. Samples include all children aged 15 to 18 or 15 to
16 residing with a parent that was aged 14 between 1915 and 1969. Standard errors are in parenthesis. See text for
more data specifics. 
Sum of Parents' Education Single Parent's Education
Outcome Variable:  < MEDIAN GRD
Parents' Education -0.026 -0.024 -0.022 -0.044 -0.027 -0.023 -0.020 -0.035
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.024) (0.009) (0.017) (0.032) (0.064)
Census Parent's St Cntrls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Parent's Regional Trends no no yes no no no yes no
Parent's State Trends no no no yes no no no yes
Years of schooling required before work permit  
Father's:
7 years 0.327 0.159 0.15 0.052
(0.057) (0.059) (0.059) (0.066)
8 years 0.456 0.149 0.138 0.066
(0.051) (0.052) (0.053) (0.062)
 
9 or more years 0.728 0.358 0.217 0.03
(0.067) (0.067) (0.069) (0.080)
Mother or Head's:  
7 years 0.306 0.130 0.077 0.112 0.287 0.087 0.088 0.101
(0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.072) (0.080) (0.069) (0.070) (0.082)
 
8 years 0.470 0.167 0.095 0.087 0.472 0.133 0.113 0.064
(0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.067) (0.072) (0.061) (0.062) (0.077)
 
9 or more years 0.753 0.398 0.211 0.074 0.734 0.368 0.232 0.139
(0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.082) (0.085) (0.073) (0.075) (0.090)
F-statistic (instruments) 85.1 21.3 5.4 0.9 32.1 12.5 3.8 0.9




Sensitivity of IV Estimates to Additional Controls
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year. Additional
controls include percent black, percent asian, percent female and average age of the children in each cell. Census
Parent's State Controls include state population, doctors per capita, value per acre of farm land, % foreign born, %
urban, % manufacturing, % black, and average wages. Data are grouped into means by parent's birth year, state of
birth, and census year, and weighted by cell population size. Huber-White standard errors are shown from
clustering by birth cohort and state of birth.  Samples include all children aged 7 to 15 with U.S. born parents aged 
14 between 1915 and 1969.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  See text for more data specifics.<MEDIAN
Dependent Variable: GRD # of cells
Dual Parent: Sum of Parents' Education -0.015 13,939
(0.001)
Single Parent: Household Head -0.024 1,014
(0.003)
Dual Parent: Sum of Parents' Education -0.060 13,939
(0.035)




OLS and IV Estimates for States with a Downward Change in Mandatory 
School Years
Table 7
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth,
and census year. Additional controls include percent black, percent asian,
percent female and average age of the children in each cell. Data are grouped
into means by parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year, and weighted by
cell population size. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by
birth cohort and state of birth. Standard errors are in parenthesis. See text for
more data specifics.Dependent Variable:
N=
 
Dual Parent: Sum of Parents' Education -0.012 -0.012 166,768
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Single Parent: Household Head -0.024 -0.024 46,245
(0.004) (0.001)
Dual Parent: Sum of Parents' Education -0.029 -0.022 166,768
(0.009) (0.011)
Single Parent: Household Head -0.045 -0.022 46,245
(0.049) (0.024)
Parent's State of Birth Dummies Yes No
State of Residence*Parent's No Yes
               Birth Cohort (3-year)
Parent's Region of Birth Dummies No Yes
 
Table 8





Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, characteristics
of parents' state of birth (population, doctors per capita, value per acre of farm
land, % foreign born, % urban, % manufacturing, % black, average wages) and
census year. Additional controls include percent black, percent asian, percent
female and average age of the children in each cell. Huber-White standard errors
are shown from clustering by birth cohort and state of birth. Standard errors are
in parenthesis.  See text for more data specifics.1960 1970 1980 Combined 1960 1970 1980 Combined
Age 40.85 40.43 39.49 40.29 38.84 38.22 36.26 37.49
(7.26) (7.13) (7.09) (7.18) (7.93) (7.68) (7.20) (7.61)
Highest Grade 10.29 11.47 12.60 11.41 9.36 10.43 11.56 10.70
(3.64) (3.39) (3.27) (3.56) (3.35) (3.06) (2.66) (3.08)
Age 37.51 37.44 36.78 37.27
(6.53) (6.57) (6.32) (6.49)
Highest Grade 10.56 11.38 12.17 11.35
(2.88) (2.50) (2.41) (2.68)
Age 10.70 10.94 11.08 10.90 11.05 11.08 11.14 11.10
(2.52) (2.55) (2.57) (2.55) (2.56) (2.57) (2.58) (2.57)
Highest Grade 4.22 4.43 4.55 4.40 4.43 4.52 4.55 4.51
(2.57) (2.62) (2.64) (2.61) (2.63) (2.65) (2.62) (2.63)
Black 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.35             
Female 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50
            
REPEAT 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.22
<MEDIAN GRD 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.25
Observations 233,080 266,265 211,727 711,072 26,939 45,462 57,231 129,632
Children
Dual Parent Families Single Parent Families
Appendix Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Father or Household Head among Single Parent Families
Mother